The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international environment.
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem.
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the following website: http://www.bde.es.
Introduction
External imbalances have been widening since the beginning of the decade although they have started to moderate last year. The sum of current account surpluses worldwide has surpassed 2% of global GDP, compared to 0.7% in 2001, as seen in graph 1, top) 1 . More interestingly, the group of emerging market countries (EMEs) have become since then net creditors to the advanced economies: the current accounts of EMEs with surpluses add up to close to 1.5% of global GDP, similar to the sum of developed countries external deficits.
1. The figures for deficit evolve similarly but there are divergences due to error and omissions and conversions to a common currency.
GRAPH 1: GLOBAL IMBALANCES

Source: IFS (IMF)
Gulf Countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar (*) An increase in REER means an appreciation. (Gulf countries surplus surpassed 25% of their domestic GDP) account for 1% c/a surpluses in terms of world GDP; on the deficit side US stands out (5% of its GDP or 1.3% of world GDP).
The US has endured a substantial exchange rate adjustment since 2002 which should contribute in the medium run to moderate the external deficit, see graph 1, bottom, although the evolution of oil prices has dampened the adjustment. On the contrary, exchange rate developments in surplus countries have been less favorable for the adjustment: the real exchange rate of China ⎯which still holds a soft peg to the dollar⎯ and the oil countries ⎯many of them dollar pegs have only recently started to appreciate in the last years, and mostly due to inflation differentials.
Economic theory would suggest that capital tends to flow from developed to developing countries, where the expected return on capital is supposed to be larger. Therefore, the financing of developing countries to developed economies can be considered an anomaly, or, as famously labeled by Nobel prize Robert Lucas (1990) a paradox. At that time, the uncertainty on growth prospects in developing countries, the risks perceived and the reduced global financial liberalization could justify the pattern of flows [Alfaro et al. (2008) ]. But in the last decade growth prospects have materialized in the developing world, volatility has been lower, and great leaps in global financial integration have been implemented, so that capital inflows to developing countries should increase. Indeed, as observed in graph 2 gross private capital inflows to emerging economies have multiplied by eight during this decade, from less than 200 $bn in the late nineties to more than 1600 $bn in 2007.
How is it then possible to conciliate both facts: their net creditor position against developed countries and the accruing of ever larger capital inflows? Just by the huge growth of capital outflows that emerging economies are engineering through two main mechanisms: foreign exchange reserves accumulation and sovereign wealth funds (SWF). But note that this implies the bulk of EMEs financing to advanced economies is done by public (sovereign) institutions.
We denote this category of capital as sovereign external assets (SEAs). More precisely we define SEAs as the sum of reserves and sovereign wealth funds assets invested abroad 2 .
Since they are central to the economic policy of the main EMEs contributors to the global imbalances (China/reserves, Gulf countries/SWFs) they potentially play a central role in their determination.
There has been a large body of literature focusing on the contribution of reserve accumulation in EMEs to covering US financial needs, mainly through its role as preventing nominal exchange rate adjustments [see for instance Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2008) and references therein]. In contrast, there is hardly any study focusing on SWF in this context, maybe because this financial category has come to the fore of policy discussions only recently. Therefore, our main contribution in this paper is the attention paid to SWF and the comparison to with reserve accumulation. We argue that they play a similar role explaining global imbalances. As a matter of fact we state that ⎯assuming that commodity prices remain at high levels⎯ SWF may play an increasing contribution to the maintenance of global imbalances, also relatively to reserve accumulation since the perceived costs ⎯economic or reputational⎯ attached to them are low.
2. There are other public or semi-public capital flows, such as those arising from public firms investing abroad which could enter this category. Although relevant in recent times, they are dismissed from the analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we present quantifications on the transfers received by SWFs in the last years, and obtain the evolution of their assets under management in the last years. In section 3, we define the concept of sovereign external assets from the decomposition of the balance of payments accounts. Then, in section 4 we compare reserves and SWFs in terms of evolution, motivation, costs, and their economic implications. Finally, we pave the way to assess their importance in sustaining global imbalances, now and in the future. Therefore, our aim is to provide an estimation of a globally consistent time series of SWF assets. We combine a direct approach, namely a quantification of transfers and assets of a given SWF when they are know, and an indirect approach that tracks these variables from the impact of SWFs on other statistics (such as balance of payment, fiscal accounts, or central bank's balance sheets), and ensure the consistency of both. When a country has several SWFs ⎯v.g.
Singapore⎯, we estimate their total assets, and the assets of each of the SWFs, when available, serves just as cross-check.
The countries under study can be divided, according to data availability and institutional framework, in three groups, as shown in table 1: standard SWF with ample disclosure, standard SWF with no disclosure, and SWF embedded in central banks' balance sheets.
The first group of countries provides disclosure on its size and transfers received by their respective SWFs. This information allows to compute the evolution of the SWF in a rather straightforward way from their balances and some additional information. For the rest of countries, the computations get more complex, since the degree of transparency is much lower.
The estimation of assets and transfers for SWFs with no disclosure is more challenging; however, it is possible to obtain estimations on their size and evolution using data on fiscal accounts, balance of payments, and additional reports.
The third category refers to countries ⎯v.g. Saudi Arabia or Russia⎯ which manage their SWFs through the central bank balance sheets. For this group of countries it is necessary to disentangle "pure international reserves" (those net of the external assets of SWF included in the central bank balance sheet), from those international reserves which are backed by central government deposits, that is, which at the end of the day are the external assets of SWF. To do so, we build on central bank balance sheet data, in which there is usually an account with deposits from central government. The resulting figures are then cross-checked with balance of payments, fiscal data and other evidence. Two final considerations relevant for the analysis are valuation effects and the share of assets invested abroad. Valuation effects can be relevant for those SWF which have more aggressive investment strategies (such as, for instance, the SWF of Norway, Singapore, Kuwait or UAE) and for all of them due to exchange rate movements because they determine the level and evolution of the assets. However, it is awkward to do even a rough approximation to them. On the contrary, we have disentangled, when possible, external from internal assets of SWF, since we wish to focus in the former 3 . The data are quite patchy, but the difference is particularly important in Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent in Russia and Norway. Table 2 presents the evolution of SWFs on a country-basis, and the estimated share of external assets in their portfolios ⎯which is extremely high for the aggregate (93% in 2007)⎯. The right-hand term of the equation, the sum of the increase in SWFs assets and reserve accumulation constitute the increase in sovereign external assets (SEAs) of a country.
Note that large current account surpluses and strong capital inflows can be offset by the accumulation of reserves and sovereign wealth funds; that is, the growth in sovereign external assets can explain the puzzle outlined in the introduction. .
The features of SWFs and reserves, compared
The common categorization of reserves and sovereign wealth funds as sovereign external assets suggests that they have common features ⎯in particular, in explaining global imbalances, but they also display important differences in terms of evolution, motivation or management. Table 3 compares both.
One common feature is their dramatic growth in the last years, although the stock of Reserves represent two thirds of this magnitude (11.2% of world GDP) and the SWFs the remaining third (4.5% of world GDP). Growth in SWFs has implied that their share in sovereign assets has substantially: in 2003 they represented around 20% of sovereign assets, by now they are around 30%.
4.
The difference between the bars is due to errors and omissions. 5. The case of China in the figure merits a comment. As shown in the graphs the net private capital inflows were close to nil. This is striking because it is known that capital inflows to China are huge (close to 200 $bn in 2006). Therefore private capital outflows must match that quantity. These private capital outflows took the form of foreign investment abroad (semi-public firms) or holding of foreign assets by domestic banks. This last items is related to monetary policy implementation and, in particular, to avoid, appreciating exchange rate pressures.
A second common trait is that both international reserves and sovereign wealth funds are very much concentrated in developing economies (see graph 4).
The bulk of reserve accumulation (graph 4, upper left) has taken place in Asia ⎯including Japan until 2004), which accounts for more than half of world reserves. China, which holds over 1.5 trillion of international reserves (a 30% of the total), dominates the picture.
Other emerging regions, such as Latin America have accumulated large holdings of reserves ⎯reaching 12.7 of GDP in the region as a whole, although their share in the global holdings is much smaller (6.5% of total reserves). The evolution and geographical location of sovereign external assets is explained by the motivation for reserve accumulation and SWFs, which is to a large extent different.
Two In any case, it is hard to deny that the exchange rate management motive is nowadays a significant driver of reserve accumulation. The policy objectives of this strategy can be diverse: to foster competitiveness; to avoid exchange rate overshooting induced by short-term volatile capital inflows or transitory shocks; or to avoid negative sectoral impacts on some exposed sectors (Dutch disease), a reason closely connected to positive commodity shocks, etc. [see Alberola and Serena (2007) for a more detailed discussion].
The rationale for the constitution of SWF is intertemporal and/or intergenerational smoothing. The intensity of commodity price cycle and its large impact of exporters advise for the accumulation of resources in the good times to keep for the bad times. Furthermore, the non-renewable nature of some commodity resources, such as oil, calls for the investment of a part of the accrued resources for the benefit of future generations, in the form of financial investments abroad, or of real investment at home (predominantly directed to diversify the economic structure of the countries).
The diverse motivation of reserve accumulation and SWFs highlight a fundamental difference among these SEAs. Both are the result of a policy decision. However, SWFs can be understood as a natural consequence ⎯out of prudence⎯ of the economic structure of a country to smooth the impact of commodity shocks. Accumulation of reserves is a discretionary policy geared ⎯beyond the precautionary motive⎯ to maintain the exchange at a desired level and a comfortable external position.
Thus, it can be argued that SWFs are the result of a policy action to smooth extreme economic impact ⎯and drastic adjustments⎯ derived from large exogenous shocks, while reserve accumulation is rather directed to maintain a favourable competitiveness position.
In other words, although both limit automatic external adjustment, the case for SWFs is stronger and more justifiable in economic terms than the case for reserve accumulation.
The motivation for each SEA also explains the difference in their investment strategies. In general, reserve accumulations are held in fixed income, most of it public (US Treasuries are the main component in reserves, in particular in those countries pegged or with strong links to the dollar), since the priority is liquidity. Therefore, the returns on the reserves tend to be low. On the contrary, investments by SWFs tend to be less conservative ⎯although far from highly risky⎯ and directed to the long run. Sometimes investments are directed to foreign firms, so that the proportion of equity ⎯and private equity⎯ tends to be relevant.
Another relevant difference is the counterpart of the sovereign assets in the balance sheets of the holding institutions. International reserves are central bank assets and their "automatic" counterpart of the increase is an increase in the monetary supply (a liability of the central bank), unless this expansion is avoided by sterilization operations. In this case the liabilities to the banking system (in form of bonds or deposits) become then the counterpart of the increase in reserves. In stark contrast, the counterpart to SWF assets is their own capital, as SWFs are rarely leveraged (which explains their financial strength).
These investment and balance sheet features imply that the net return on SWF tends to be higher than on reserves. Indeed, the return on reserves if the sterilization becomes too costly (see below) can be negative.
Sovereign external assets, internal adjustment and global imbalances
The comparison of reserves and SWFs should be completed by exploring its respective role in the persistence of global imbalances. The mechanism is outlined in graph 5, which shows the close similarity between both components. The chart also underscores that there are two dimensions in the analysis: how SEAs act as a barrier to the internal adjustment and how they interact with the global imbalances, which we examine in turn.
SEAs as preventing internal adjustment
If we recall our previous identity, from a balance of payments perspective the accumulation of SEAs by a country is simply the counterpart of its current account surplus plus capital inflows.
However, from an economic viewpoint the existence of current account surplus and capital inflows is an expansionary and inflationary shock whose accommodation requires an internal economic adjustment ⎯see left part of graph 5. More precisely, the correction of a (too wide) current account surplus or a sustained net inflow of capitals requires the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which reduces competitiveness and tends to shrink the trade balance and moderate domestic activity. From a financial perspective, capital inflows increase the demand for domestic currency and therefore tend to appreciate the exchange rate.
The accumulation of SEAs, acts a barrier which prevents this internal adjustment from taking place and, thus, tends to prolong the domestic imbalances. by Asian economies and the need of the US to finance ever wider current account deficits.
Indeed, the large increase in reserves ⎯beyond the precautionary motive as noted⎯ and the clear bias towards US securities gives some support to this theory, although there are some doubts about its sustainability. . But note 6. Many of the Gulf countries sustain hard pegs with the dollar. But note that this is not a direct consequence of the existence of sovereign wealth funds; it is an independent monetary policy decision. As a matter of fact, in spite of the pegs the increase in reserves in these countries has been limited, implying that the resources accruing to the SWFs act as a substitute to reserve accumulation.
high (that is, the TOT shock lingers) the economy will be out of its natural long-term equilibrium:
the exchange rate will remain misaligned and the external surplus will be kept large. Indeed, the accumulation of assets can be seen as a way to smooth the adjustment or, even, to delay it until the commodity price cycle turns.
Thus, in practice, the mechanism is analogous than in the case in reserves. But, contrary to that case, the accumulation of resources in SWFs does not entail an automatic increase in the monetary supply, it does not require sterilization and therefore overcomes domestic monetary and financial costs and strains identified in the case of reserves. This lack of costs suggests that the domestic constrains to the accumulation of SWFs are much less relevant than in the case of reserves and that, as long as the prices of commodity remain high, they are placed in a better position relative to reserve accumulation going forward. The role of SEAs in covering US external financial needs
The graph 5 suggests the recycling of international reserves and SWF assets into the global markets in the form of capital outflows, feeding the external imbalances of other (developed) countries, and so enabling, also in this case, to avoid their adjustment. In this section, we aim at providing some rule-of-thumb computations of the role of SEAs (in particular SWFs) in the financing of global imbalances, focusing on the US deficit, focusing first in its role to date and second on their prospects.
US financing needs
The large US deficit is probably the key element of global imbalances. Indeed, it could be argued that the adjustment of the US deficit or net financing needs is well underway (see graph 7). The 
The coverage of US financing by SEAs to date
These numbers suggest that, in spite of the adjustment the US imbalance is still large and it is expected to remain so. Now we move to assess role of sovereign external assets ⎯first the SWF assets then reserves⎯ in its financing, through some simple and approximate back-of-envelope calculations. Given the lack of accurate data on sovereign wealth funds holdings, it does not come as a surprise that there is no analysis of their role in covering US financing needs. In annex 1 we explain the methodology used to estimate financial inflows of SWFs into US, which roughly consists in estimating the weight of US assets within SWFs investments portfolio, and assuming that average holdings match marginal holdings (that any increase in the assets managed by SWF will be invested in US assets in the same proportion). We estimate ⎯with a large degree of uncertainty⎯ there that around 40% of SWF assets may be invested in US assets. In the last year the figure has increased to 42% due to a higher growth of SWFs more prone to invest in the 
GRAPH 7: US FINANCING NEEDS
Source: IFS and WEO (IMF).
reserves include both purchases of US assets and valuation effects. Given the trend depreciation of the dollar in the last years this implies a reduction of the stock of US$ reserves, relative to dollar original purchases. This offset to some extent ⎯but surely not completely⎯ the previous bias. In any case, we stick to the COFER figure, in absence of any better non-arbitrary alternative.
As When we consider the whole SEAs, that is, the sum of reserves and SWF assets, we observe that, the coverage ratio of the net financing needs (SEAs US inflows / current account) was 135% last year from an average 80% since 2003. The share of reserves has been stable around 80% and the SWFs the remaining 20%.
Therefore, the importance of sovereign external assets has greatly increased in the last years, surpassing the trillion dollars in 2007 and thus, representing more than half of the gross capital inflows into the US last year.
These results are quite remarkable, but the quantitative and qualitative importance of SEAs could even increase in relative terms, if the fragile financial situation of the US continues ⎯which implies that other sources of financing are becoming less available⎯ and commodity prices recover the high levels of the recent years.
Perspectives on US financing by Sovereign External assets
The assessment of the future importance of SWF in US financing requires some projection of the evolution of transfers to SWF. For this purpose, it is useful to divide SWFs between oil-related SWFs, and other SWFs, given the importance of the former and its close link to oil prices, (graph 4 C shows the close correlation between the oil prices and transfers to oil-related SWFs). There is not concrete information on the determinants of transfers to oil-related SWFs, and on whether they are discretionary or rule-based, so we attempt to fit a regression on their evolution. The precise functional form of the regression is inspired by the accepted rationale of the SWFs, although by lack of a long time series the projections are necessarilly very rough. The resulting increase in (transfers to) oil-related SWF assets is assumed to depend on the current price of oil (saving motive) and on the difference between the current oil price and a reference medium-term equilibrium price (smoothing motive)
10
. We take the equilibrium price to be the moving average of oil prices the previous 4-years. The fitted curve is plotted as the dark green dashed line in graph 9, and we see that it closely matches the actual transfers.
Looking ahead, rough estimates of the increase in oil-related SWFs can be computed, for any forecast of oil prices The fitted regression suggests that a fall (increase) of 10 dollars in oil prices reduces (increases) transfers to SWFs in 95 bn US$. Therefore, using the IMF's October 
11
. We are aware that extrapolating the results might yield inexact results, due to issues such as the discretionary component in transfers, the possible instability of the transfers' rule, or possible non-linearities in the link between oil prices and transfers. Finally, we estimate transfers to oil-related SWFs in an aggregate way, and given that different countries probably have different transfers' rules (policy reaction functions), changes in oil prices might change the aggregate reaction function. 12. The US imports of oil barrels are around 4.0 billion. Assuming a zero-elasticity of imports to prices, an increase of 10 dollars in oil prices increases US financing needs in 40 billion US$. However, in the following years -according to our SWF accummulation rule ⎯see footnote 11⎯, the increase in SWF progressively diminishes to just 20 $bn. This means that, in steady state, the impact of a permanent increase in oil prices only finances half of the additional trade deficit in the US.
Forecasting the evolution of transfers to the rest of SWF is more complex, given the different sources and determinants. Hence, we assume that they will grow the average of the last four years (the years for which we have reliable information), that is, 54 billion US dollars per year.
According to our results, SWF assets would increase more than 500 $bn in 2008, and they would average close to 250 bn in the remaining years until 2012, so that the stock of SWF assets would almost double by the end of 2012 to reach more than 4 trillion dollars at the end of 2012, of which 3.5 trillion would be managed by oil-related SWF (see graph 10).
We can make a similar exercise with the evolution of reserves, but forecasting their evolution is more problematic. As a matter of fact, the growth of reserves has even accelerated in This exercise has assumed that the share of investments in the US remains fixed at the current high levels, which is a rather strong assumption. As a matter of fact, some analyst expect or predict that sovereign external assets will start moving out of the dollar, due to the doubts on the financial and currency strength of the United States. There are two kind of expected shifts:
first, a lower share of investments in the US by reserve managers and SWFs; second, a move from reserves to SWFs, searching for a higher yield along the lines of the Chinese SWF mentioned above [see Beck and Fidora (2008) ].
Hence, we assess the impact of this sort of shifts in the coverage of the US financing needs, comparing our benchmark with three additional scenarios, which are summed up as follows:
I. Benchmark. 40% of SWFs increase and 60% of the increase in reserves are invested in the US.
II. Scenario 2. The share of US investments reduced by a quarter. Thus 30% of SWFs increase and 45% of the increase in reserves are invested in the US. III. Scenario 3. The benchmark shares are maintained, but we assume that 50% of the increase in reserves is moved to SWFs, as the incipient trend of reserve-related SWFs would suggest
13
.
IV. Scenario 4 is the most extreme, combining a stronger version of the two previous scenarios. All the increase in reserves is shifted to SWFs, and they allocate only 30% of their assets to the US.
Under these alternative scenarios, the coverage of the net financing needs is reduced relative to the benchmark: 90% in scenario 2, 104% in scenario 3 and falls below total coverage (to 66%) in scenario 4.
All in all, these results suggest that asset accumulation by central banks and SWFs generates large financial inflows to the US relative to US net financing needs, even if the investment strategies SEAs are notably modified.
We could thus conclude that the financing of the US current account deficit should not be difficult in the years ahead because SEAs provide a thick buffer. This conclusion could be jeopardised under a dramatic turnaround of recent trends. Three main factors could trigger such reversal: a) the end or reversal of SEAs growth, due to a collapse in the price of commodities (affecting SWFs) the move to a free float (affecting reserves) or a capital flow reversal (affecting probably both). In the first case, it is important to note that, as mentioned above, lower oil prices not only reduce SWFs' resources, but also the US financing needs.
b) a massive shift of SEAs out of US dollars; c) a massive shift of reserve stocks to SWFs assets, which are less prone to invest in US.
An alternative reading is that a reduction in the available resources to SWFs ⎯consequence of lower oil prices⎯ is not worrisome, indeed, to the extent that would be associated to a larger reduction of the US financing needs.
13. Beck and Fidora (2008) consider the extreme scenario in which the whole reserve holdings are moved to SWFs, which we consider rather unrealistic. Our exercise (analyzing the impact on capital flows of sovereign saving through SWFs, instead than doing it through central banks) is more similar in spirit to that of IMF (2008b).
Conclusions
The original motivation of the paper has been to explain the apparent puzzle in a large number of emerging market economies: they have large current account surpluses ⎯and therefore, they are net creditors to the rest of the world⎯ while they have been flooded by foreign capital inflows in the last years.
The answer to this puzzle is the massive amounts of sovereign external assets (SEAs) accumulated by these states: Central Banks' foreign exchange reserves and transfers to Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). We analyze in this paper their role in sustaining global imbalances in the recent past and going forward. The following conclusions can be derived from this analysis:
• SWF and reserves assets play a similar role regarding global imbalances: both help to cover the financing needs of deficit countries ⎯in particular in the US⎯ and simultaneously, both hinder internal adjustment in current account surplus countries.
• In quantitative terms the role of SEAs in covering US financial needs has become central, according to our back-of-envelope calculations. Assuming that 60% of reserves and 40% of SWF assets are invested in the US, SEAs are estimated to represent one trillion dollars, that is around half of the gross financial inflows in the US, and 130% of the net financial needs.
• Reserves have been relatively much more important in the recent past: in 2007, the stock of reserves was three times larger than SWF holdings; the estimated contribution of reserves to covering the US financial needs was four times larger than SWF.
• However, going forward, SWF are expected to gain relevance, provided that commodity prices in the long run regain high levels. In this case, the increase in SWFs will remain large, while the future accumulation of reserves is much more difficult to predict. Furthermore, the marginal costs of accumulating reserves are increasing in monetary, fiscal and financial terms; on the contrary, the perceived costs of SWFs accumulation are low or non-existent. Finally, and related to this, there is an incipient trend of shifting reserves towards SWFs, which is expected to gather speed in the next years.
• A simple exercise projecting SEAs into the next five years ⎯estimating the growth of SWF assets under the expectation of high oil prices and assuming the continuation of growth in reserves⎯ suggests that their role in financing will be even more relevant going forward, even under a moderate reduction of the share of US assets in SEAs investments.
• Only the end or reversal of SEAs growth, a massive shift of SEAs out of US dollars or the massive shift of reserve stocks to SWFs assets, which are less prone to invest in US could jeopardise these conclusion. It is difficult to assess the probability of the turnaround, although it could be argued that the current financial context may have increased it.
• All in all, the central scenario implies that the continued expansion of SEAs will support the global imbalances in the short and medium run.
Annex 1: Asset allocation of SWF: share of investments in US
The importance of SWFs in the financing of the US current account deficit is determined by the proportion of assets invested by SWF in the US. In this annex, the approximate weight of US assets in SWFs portfolios is assessed, assuming ⎯as a benchmark case⎯ that their marginal investment matches their portfolio allocation 14 .
SWF do not usually provide the currency breakdown of their portfolios, with the remarkable exceptions of Norway (where one third of the assets are held in dollars), and Russia (where dollar-denominated assets account for 45% of the portfolio). Setser and Ziemba (2008), which provide estimations for some SWFs: according to them Kuwait, Qatar and UAE would hold about 52% and 40%, and 45% of its total SWF assets in dollars, while about 75% of the assets of the Saudi Arabian SWF could be denominated in US dollars
15
. The total proportion of SWF in dollars for these countries ⎯which represent 1800 $bn, 80% of total SWF assets⎯ is 47%. For the remaining eleven countries with SWF we assume that they hold the same proportion of the assets in US dollars, which is the weighted average of the countries for which there are estimations.
Note that a final step is needed, since it cannot be assumed that currency breakdown matches geographical allocation (i.e., that all assets denominated in US dollars are issued in the US), especially for fixed income. For non-fixed income assets we assume that currency breakdown matches geographical allocation, but for fixed income, we adjust the share of dollar assets by the fraction of the global fixed income dollar portfolio invested in US assets, which can 14. The alternative approach to estimate the investments in US is the use of official US data on foreign holdings of US assets (TIC data), but it displays many important and well-known problems (the same that the identification problems of central banks' transactions). Plainly, that they do not track transactions between non-residents, and that group all official transactions (SWFs and central banks, among others). Furthermore, the larger share of investments in equity expected by the SWF heightens the uncertainty. Indeed, according to TIC data, oil exporting countries would hold over 340 billion dollars, which is a very low figure, if oil & energy related SWFs manage close to 2 trillion dollars. 15. The bulk of the assets of the SWF of Saudi Arabia are managed by the central bank (Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority, SAMA) on behalf of the last owner, and their investment strategy of such assets is very similar to that of the international reserves of SAMA. Setser and Ziemba (2008) be obtained from BIS statistics, and it is 75%. Since fixed income is 60% of the global portfolio, this implies that 85% of SWF dollar assets are invested in the US. As a result of these computations, 40% of total SWF holdings, and 42% of the increase in 2007 are estimated to be invested in US. The difference is due to the higher rate of growth of those SWFs which higher propensities to invest in the US.
*In bold SWFs for which there is either official information, or estimations in Setser and Ziemba (2008).
Source: Owns estimation (building on national statistics, SWFs reports), IFS (IMF) and
